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Abstract: 
This paper analyses the French political crisis since the late 1970s by investigating the links between 
the social structure and the economic policy expectations of the electorate. To this end, data on 
post-electoral survey are used to estimate structural models of political support to political parties 
for 1978 and 2012, and the estimation results are used to propose an analysis of the French crisis. 
The enduring French political crisis is found to be the expression of contradictions between the 
economic policies implemented by the successive governments and the existence of a dominant 
social bloc, i.e. a coalition of social groups that would politically support the dominant political 
strategy. Since 1978, both the right and the left have failed to find a solution to the contradictions 
between the policies they implemented and the expectations of their social bases, which are 
themselves inhabited by tensions and contradictions that evolve with the structure of French 
capitalism. The failure of all governing coalitions so far is a new expression of that of the 
͞ŵodeƌŶists͟ to take iŶto aĐĐouŶt the eǆpeĐtatioŶs of the populaƌ Đlasses. 
Keywords: France, political crisis, political economy, social base,  
 
 
Résumé: 
Ce papier analyse la crise politique française depuis la fin des années 1970 en étudiant les liens entre 
la stƌuĐtuƌe soĐiale et les atteŶtes de politiƋue éĐoŶoŵiƋue de l͛éleĐtoƌat. A Đette fiŶ, les doŶŶées 
post-électorales sont utilisées pour estimer deux modèles structurels de soutien aux partis politiques 
pour 1978 et 2012. Les résultats des estimations éclairent les raisons de la crise politique. Celle-ci est 
l͛eǆpƌessioŶ des ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶs eŶtƌe les politiƋues suiǀies paƌ les gouǀeƌŶeŵeŶts suĐĐessifs et 
l͛eǆisteŶĐe d͛uŶe ďase soĐiale staďle, d͛uŶ ďloĐ soĐial doŵiŶaŶt, une coalition de groupes sociaux qui 
valideraient politiquement la stratégie politique dominante. Depuis 1978, la droite et la gauche ont 
éĐhoué daŶs leuƌ ƌeĐheƌĐhe d͛uŶe solutioŶ à Đes ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶs, eŶtƌe les politiƋues Ƌu͛elles 
souhaitaient mener et les attentes de leurs bases sociales, qui sont elles-mêmes traversées par des 
tensions et contradictions qui évoluent avec la structure du capitalisme français. Cet échec est une 
manifestation du retour des insuffisances de la stratégie des « modernistes » et de leur refus de 
prendre en compte les attentes des classes populaires. 
Mots-clés : France, crise politique, économie politique, base sociale 
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1. Introduction 
At the time of the 1978 legislative elections, France had been governed by a right 
government coalition for 20 years. Following the first oil shock, GDP growth had slowed down from a 
5.4% annual average between 1950 and 1973 to 3% for the 1974-1978 period, and unemployment 
had risen above 4%. The political and economic leaders were gradually changing their views on the 
economic situation, which was no longer perceived as a temporary slowdown due to energy price 
increases, but more as the entry into a new era characterised by increased competition and 
diminished expectations. The choice offered to the electorate could be summarised as an opposition 
between two types of economic policy and structural reform programs. On the left, a political 
alliance (union de la gauche), in spite of having broken up a year before and been awkwardly 
mended between the first and the second round of the elections, was still the main reference for a 
possible government coalition. The joint manifesto (programme commun) proposed a series of 
economic reforms based on the nationalisation of the bulk of manufacturing industry and banks, the 
development of industrial democracy and social protection, and a macroeconomic policy supporting 
income and effective demand growth. The ultimate aim was a gradual break-up (rupture) with 
capitalism (Beaud 1983, 1985). On the right, the main parties (post-Gaullist RPR and UDF) were 
redefining their economic policy orientations away from the support to effective demand and the 
search of external competitiveness through devaluations, towards wage austerity and the restoration 
of fiƌŵs͛ profit margins, currency stability ;the ͞stƌoŶg FƌaŶĐ͟ poliĐǇͿ, the fight against inflation and 
the decrease in state intervention, opposing the economic and social transformations of the 
programme commun. The right parties, in spite of an open rivalry between their respective leaders, 
kept their joint participation in a government coalition as a political objective without any credible 
alternative. 
The environment of the presidential and legislative elections of 2012 could be described in 
very different terms. Since the late 1970s, left and right governments had succeeded one another 
and the growth trend had kept decreasing (1.8% on average for 1979-2012); the unemployment rate 
had climbed over 9% since the Great Recession. For the first time since the late 1960s, the main party 
of the left, the parti socialiste (PS) had entered the electoral competition without any predefined 
electoral alliance associating other parties on its left.1 Furthermore, it promoted as one of its main 
economic policy objectives the return to ͞sound͟ public finance ─ a budget deficit under the 3% mark 
within one year and a balanced budget after 5 years ─ in order to regain the lost AAA credit rating. 
The realisation of the modest social part of the program was conditioned on improved 
macroeconomic performance. The right had become highly heterogeneous. The mainstream 
government parties RPR and UDF, which had merged to form the UMP, proposed a more or less 
moderate neoliberal policy orientation, the moderation aspect having been stressed after the Great 
Recession. But the UMP faced competition for the right electorate coming from: (i) the nationalist 
right party (Front National, FN), with an economic program blaming austerity imposed by Europe and 
the financial markets, and advocating the exit from the Euro to save the social protection system; (ii) 
the centre-right MoDem, which proposed labour market liberalisation and large cuts in public 
expenditure.  
How can this significant change in the economic policy and political landscape be analysed? 
The change was particularly dramatic for the left. The main options of its economic program in the 
1970s, such as nationalisations or the extension of social protection, were no longer present.  Public 
finance orthodoxy and the restoration of iŶǀestoƌs͛ ĐoŶfideŶĐe, traditional themes for the right, had 
become predominant, and new topics, such as the preservation of the environment, had emerged.  
                                                          
1
 The communist party had either participated to previous left governments or supported the PS-led 
governments without participation. 
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One could argue that enduring mass unemployment, slow growth and increasing economic 
integration would impose a pressure to adapt to a new type of capitalism and that the economic 
policy style and economic institutions inherited from the post-war period would no longer be fitted 
to a new environment dominated by a rapid technological change and intensified international 
competition (Sapir 2004). This would make the economic policy expectations carried by the 
traditional left social base at the end of the 1970s impossible to satisfy, all the more so that this 
social base would be weakened by deindustrialisation and fragmented by individualisation. One 
could mention an abundant literature derived from Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) that explains such 
changes by the rise of post-materialist issues, as a consequence of the increase in income and wealth 
levels in developed countries. These transformations would imply a redefinition of the political 
competition away from the issues related to the distribution of material resources and class conflict, 
as well as a decline of the left-right divide based on the economic dimension.  
However, the political difficulties experienced by all incumbent governments, the instability 
of the political party structure or the rejection in 2005 by 55% of the voters ─  79% of the workers vs. 
35% of the high-skilled─2 of a European Constitutional Treaty supported by all mainstream parties, 
suggest that the trouble for the political supply to adjust to ǀoteƌs͛ eǆpeĐtatioŶs is Ŷot the eǆĐlusiǀe 
of the left, and that one witnesses neither the total disappearance of class voting nor a smooth 
transition to a new socio-political equilibrium.  
A simple explanation would directly relate the political crisis to the economic situation. 
Indeed, since the 1970s, the growth slowdown, the constraints on public finance and the increase in 
unemployment have made the definition and the implementation of an economic policy more 
difficult, particularly since the Great Recession. But the postulate of a direct influence of the 
macroeconomic performance on political stability is in contradiction for instance with the failure of 
Lionel Jospin at the 2002 presidential election, after a term characterised by improved public finance 
and a significant drop in unemployment due to a more rapid growth.3  
The basic postulate adopted in what follows is that the problems met by left as well as right 
government parties for the past three decades are linked to the impossibility to find a dynamic 
compatibility between on the one hand a stable social base and on the other hand an economic 
policy and structural reform program. The diversity of expectations among social groups and the 
constraints of the institutional and economic environment have made it impossible to find a 
mediation that would be supported by a sufficiently large socio-political coalition, a dominant social 
bloc (Amable and Palombarini 2009). The existence of contradictions between an economic 
modernisation strategy and the stability of a certain social structure has been a recurring problem in 
post-War France. To a large extent, the problems characterising contemporary France are similar to 
those ŵet ďǇ the ͞ŵodeƌŶists͟ in the post-War period (Gauron 1983), who failed to solve the 
contradictions between the consequences of the modernisation of economic structures and their will 
to limit the political power of the popular classes. 
The analysis of the political crisis requires an investigation of the links between social 
structures and the economic policy expectations of the electorate, and of the influence of these on 
the potential political support of political parties. To this end, data on post-electoral survey are used 
to estimate structural models of political support to political parties for 1978 and 2012, and the 
estimation results are used to propose an analysis of the French crisis. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 exposes the main elements of the ongoing 
French political crisis. Section 3 presents the data and models used in the empirical estimations. 
Section 4 discusses the results of the estimation. Section 5 analyses the causes of the political crisis in 
the light of these results. Section 6 considers the attempts of the mainstream parties to deal with the 
                                                          
2
 Post-electoral poll, ISPSOS, http://www.ipsos.fr/ipsos-public-affairs/sondages/referendum-29-mai-2005-
sondage-sorti-urnes 
3
 The average annual growth rate was 2.5% for 1997-2002 against 1.2% for 1993-1996. 
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crisis and find stable social bases, in particular the modernist strategy. Section 7 concludes on the 
unsolved contradictions of the modernist strategy. 
2. The ongoing French political crisis  
There are many signs of the existence of an enduring French political crisis, defined as the 
vanishing of the space for mediation between the divergent expectations of the social groups that 
constitute the dominant social bloc (Amable and Palombarini 2009). All incumbent governments 
have failed to be re-elected after 1978. The two cases where one right government followed another 
were the expression of internal divisions and the manifestation of a craving for change: (i) an almost 
centre-left Chirac protecting the welfare state against the conservative Balladur and his neoliberal 
policy in 1995; (ii) NiĐolas “aƌkozǇ͛s pƌogƌaŵ of rupture ǁith the alleged iŵŵoďilitǇ of ChiƌaĐ͛s 
presidency in 2007. Also, since 1981, the electoral score at the French presidential election of 
͞outsideƌs͟, defiŶed as ĐaŶdidates ǁith Ŷo ĐoŶĐƌete pƌospeĐt foƌ eŶteƌiŶg a goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ĐoalitioŶ oƌ 
outside of the left and right mainstream parties,4 has considerably increased. Whereas they jointly 
obtained the support of 7.5% of the registered voters in 1974 and 8.2% in 1981, their combined score 
rose from 18% in 1988, to 32.6% both in 2007 and 2012 (Figure 1).5 In 2002, an outsider, Front 
National͛s ĐaŶdidate JeaŶ-Marie Le Pen, even reached the second round of the election while the 
former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, candidate for the main party of the left (the PS), failed to do so. 
 
Figure 1. Vote distribution at the first round of the presidential elections in percent of registered 
voters. Data source: Ministğƌe de l’IŶtĠƌieuƌ. 
The emergence of new parties and the decline of the old ones is not by itself a sign of 
political crisis. It could be the consequence of structural change taking place in French society: the 
                                                          
4
 Until 1988, apart from marginal candidates, such as Bertrand Renouvin, a royalist candidate who obtained 
0.17% of the votes in 1974, the bulk of the outsider votes went to the trotskyist and ecologist candidates. After 
the emergence of the Front National during the 1980s, the scores of Jean-Marie Le Pen dominated the outsider 
category until 2007. After that date, another category of outsiders became prominent: candidates who quit the 
respective government parties they belonged to form their own parties and, willingly or not, stayed outside of 
the mainstream left and ƌight alliaŶĐes: FƌaŶçois BaǇƌou͛s MoDem at the Centre and Jean-LuĐ MéleŶĐhoŶ͛s 
Front de Gauche
4
 (FdG) on the left for instance. The ecologists evolved in the opposite direction, from the 
outsider to the insider category, after their participation to the PS-led government coalition in 1997 
5
 If oŶe adds aďsteŶtioŶ, the suppoƌt to ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ paƌties͛ ĐaŶdidates has ďeeŶ uŶdeƌ ϱϬ% of the ƌegisteƌed 
voters since the early 2000s, reaching a low of 38.5% in 2002. 
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increase in income, wealth or education levels, deindustrialisation and the growth of the service 
economy, or any other social or economic change that would have for consequence the decline of 
some political demands and the emergence of new expectations, or the waning of traditional social 
coalitions either on the left or on the right. But other signs prove the existence of a crisis. Most new 
parties have been kept outside of the government coalitions. Elected presidents lose popularity at an 
increasing rate. It took nearly 11 years to Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) to reach a level of confidence of 
20%, four years to Sarkozy (2007-2012) and a little over 18 months to Hollande (2012-). Such a low 
level was never even approached by any of their predecessors.6 All these elements reveal the 
difficulty to find a political equilibrium with a defined economic strategy supported by a stable social 
base. Turning to the main episodes of economic policy choices sheds a light on the difficulties that 
political supply has had to adjust to political demand. 
After the 1981 victory, the left coalition government implemented a Keynesian-type 
economic policy fuelled by real wage7 and social benefits8 increases as well as public expenditure. 
Taking place at the worst of time, when the US and the other OECD countries implemented recessive 
policies to fight inflation, the French attempt to sustain economic growth led to a dramatic increase 
in the external deficit (Figure 2) and failed to curb unemployment (Figure 3). The Franc was devalued 
in October 1981 and June 1982, and de facto devalued by the re-evaluations of the Deutsche Mark 
and the Dutch Gulden in March 1983. 
 
Figure 2. External balances. Data source: INSEE 
At the saŵe tiŵe, the ŵaiŶ fiƌŵs͛ pƌofessioŶal assoĐiatioŶ, the CNPF, lauŶĐhed a ĐaŵpaigŶ 
for a reorientation of the economic policy, demanding a drop in social contributions and a weakening 
of the Auroux laws on industrial democracy. The worsening of the economic situation and the will 
not to antagonise private firms9 in order to foster investment led to a gradual reorientation of 
                                                          
6
 Figures from TNS-Sofres, http://www.tns-sofres.com/cotes-de-popularites. 
7
 The minimum wage was raised by 10% in 1981. 
8
 Family benefits were increased by 50%. 
9
 The will of the new PS-led goǀeƌŶŵeŶt to fiŶd a ͞histoƌiĐal Đoŵpƌoŵise͟ ǁith pƌiǀate fiƌŵs ǁas pƌoĐlaiŵed ďǇ 
FƌaŶçois MitteƌƌaŶd iŶ DeĐeŵďeƌ ϭϵϴϭ: ͚PuďliĐ authoƌities aŶd fiƌŵs’ ŵaŶageƌs should Ŷot ďe oppoŶeŶts ďut 
partners͛. ;Weďeƌ ϭϵϴϲ p.ϯϮϮͿ 
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economic policy in 1982, and eventually to the U-turn of 1983. The focus shifted to pegging the 
French Franc to the Deutsche Mark, promoting wage moderation, reducing public deficits and 
reorienting structural policy towards the creation of a business-friendly environment (Lordon 1997). 
This U-turn, often presented as an awakening to economic realities (Olivennes 1993) or a 
consequence of the necessity to implement a supply-side-oriented policy because of the external 
constraint (Sachs and Wyplosz 1986) was also a defeat inflicted to the economic and social policy of 
the left (Hoang-Ngoc 2005) that had negative consequences on the social support of left parties and 
led to the electoral defeat of 1986.10 This line of economic orthodoxy, later presented as a choice in 
favour of European integration, was followed with varying degree of strictness by all following left 
governments (1988-1993 and 1997-2002), with the same electoral consequences.11   
 
Figure3. Unemployment rate. Data source: INSEE 
Anotheƌ episode of failed eleĐtoƌate͛s eǆpeĐtatioŶs took plaĐe ǁith the right. In the 1995 
pƌesideŶtial ĐaŵpaigŶ, JaĐƋue ChiƌaĐ͛s ŵaiŶ ƌiǀal ďeloŶged to the same party and was Prime Minister 
Edouard Balladur. The latteƌ͛s economic policy was based on a mix of orthodox macroeconomics and 
neoliberal structural reforms. Capitalising on social discontent, Chirac adopted as the main theme for 
his campaign the necessity to fight growing inequalities (the fracture sociale).  But whereas the 
electoral promise was to aŶsǁeƌ to the ͚populaƌ disaƌƌaǇ͛ that ͚thƌeateŶed the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s uŶitǇ͛,12 
Jacques Chirac, once elected, promoted the return to sound public finance and the reduction of 
soĐial pƌoteĐtioŶ defiĐits as his goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ŵaiŶ oďjeĐtiǀes. Once again, this U-turn, commonly 
pƌeseŶted as the ŶeĐessitǇ to iŶĐoƌpoƌate iŶ the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s pƌioƌities the eĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌealities aŶd 
the external constraint,13 had negative electoral consequences. 
Coming back to power in 1986, the right had radicalised its economic policy stance. Its 
economic program had already taken a neoliberal turn after 1978, to the point that the theme of the 
                                                          
10
 The PCF left the government in 1984 but maintained its support. 
11
 Although Lionel Jospin considered that the economic and social policy when he was Prime Minister (1997-
2002) represented a break-up with the U-turn of 1983. This is only partly true (Askenazy 2011), and the 
electorate did not concur.  
12
 Interview in the Nouvel Observateur, 12-18 January 1995 
13
 The dominant view was expressed in a report to the Prime minister (Balladur). Every national project must be 
ƌealised takiŶg iŶto ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ a ǁoƌld that iŵposes its oǁŶ ƌhǇthŵ aŶd eǀolutioŶ: ͚same as every other 
country, France must adjust͛ ;MiŶĐ, ϭϵϵϰ, p.ϯϵͿ. The saŵe idea ǁas eǆpƌessed ďǇ JaĐƋues Deloƌs a deĐade 
before (Alexandre and Delors 1985, chapter 1). 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
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last speech of ValeƌǇ GisĐaƌd d͛EstaiŶg foƌ the pƌesideŶtial ĐaŵpaigŶ of ϭϵϴϭ ǁas ͚less state͛ (Giscard 
d͛EstaiŶg ϭϵϴϰͿ, in opposition not only to the supposedlǇ ͞dirigiste͟ staŶĐe of the post-War French 
economic policy, ďut also the ͞ŵiĐƌo-dirigisme͟ practiced during his own mandate.14 The influence of 
the ͞ĐoŶseƌǀatiǀe ƌeǀolutioŶ͟ iŶ the UK aŶd the U“ ǁith Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan was 
also present. Jacques Chirac had pƌoŵised a ͞ƌatheƌ ďƌutal͟ ďƌeak-up15 with the economic policy 
previously implemented and the French economic model in general. Once elected, he launched a 
series of significant neoliberal reforms (Amable et al. 2012a) such as privatisations and labour market 
liberalisation. However, the hard line adopted by the right government antagonised so much the 
majority of the electorate, including a fraction of the social base of the right (Amable et al. 2012b), 
that the left came back to power after only two years.  
The Balladur government also lasted two years (1993-1995) and faced a considerable 
opposition on the streets when it tried to implement reforms promoting labour market flexibility, in 
particular for the under-26.16 The following Juppé government also faced at the end of 1995 the most 
important social protest movement since 1968 when it tried to reform the pension system. In 2007, 
NiĐolas “aƌkozǇ ǁas eleĐted ǁith a pƌogƌaŵŵe of ͞rupture͟ that stiƌƌed the eŶthusiasŵ of the 
supporters of a neoliberal turn in France and abroad.17 But the rupture proved to be more moderate 
than promised and by 2008, NiĐolas “aƌkozǇ͛s aŵďitioŶ ǁas Ŷo loŶgeƌ to tƌaŶsfoƌŵ the FƌeŶĐh ŵodel 
in a neoliberal way but to oppose the idea that markets were always right and call for a moralisation 
of capitalism.18 The most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression had, at least temporarily, 
made the neoliberal project infeasible (Amable et al. 2012b) and Sarkozy had to build up 
compromises in order for some of the structural reforms to succeed (Amable and Palombarini 
2014).19 
The governments of the past four decades have experienced serious difficulties in meeting 
the expectations of the electorate. The left governments (1981-1986, 1988-1993, 1997-2002) 
promoted poliĐies of ǁage ŵodeƌatioŶ aŶd ͞souŶd͟ puďliĐ fiŶaŶĐe which failed to satisfy the 
expectations of their social base for a left economic policy. The right governments have been 
perceived as too extreme in their attempts to implement neoliberal reforms (1986-1988, 1993-1995), 
or too tame (2002-2007), leadiŶg to aĐĐusatioŶs of ͞iŵŵoďilitǇ͟, or successively too adventurous and 
too cautious (2007-2012). In every case, the governing coalitions of the left and the right did not find 
how to implement an economic policy and structural reforms that would create their own social 
support.  
In order to analyse the reasons for the lack of support for the different economic policies 
followed by the successive governments for the past 30 years, it is necessary to turn to the 
expectations of the electorate and the structure of political demand. 
3. From social structure to political preferences 
In order to analyse the political demand, the simple theoretical framework represented in 
Figure 4 will be adopted. An iŶdiǀidual͛s position in the social structure is assumed to influence her or 
                                                          
14
 MaŶageƌs aĐĐused the adŵiŶistƌatioŶ uŶdeƌ ‘aǇŵoŶd Baƌƌe͛s goǀeƌŶŵeŶt to iŶteƌǀeŶe iŶ the daǇ-to-day 
management decisions of private firms in spite of having reduced macro-level dirigisme. (Weber 1986, pp.252-
253) 
15
 Radio interview, Grand Jury RTL-Le Monde, 5 May 1984. 
16
 The attempt to introduce a labour contract for the under-26s that would derogate to the protections of the 
standard contract and include a wage under the minimum legal level. 
17
 E.g. The Economist (12 April 2007): ͚FƌaŶĐe͛s ĐhaŶĐe. Afteƌ a Ƌuaƌteƌ-century of drift Nicolas Sarkozy offers 
the ďest hope of ƌefoƌŵ͛.  
18
 Speech in Toulon, 25 Spetember 2008. 
19
 Sarkozy fended off accusations of immobility by blaming the ƌesistaŶĐe of ͞iŶteƌŵediate ďodies͟ ;tƌade 
uŶioŶs, paƌties, pƌessuƌe gƌoups, eǆpeƌts…Ϳ. 
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his expectations with respect to economic policy. These in turn determine the political preferences 
and the degree of support to the different parties. One can also take into consideration the direct 
effect of the social position on the political preferences, representing support not mediated by policy 
expectations. For the purpose of the empirical investigations, the structure represented in Figure 4 
defines a recursive model which will be estimated by structural equation modelling techniques.  
The data used in the analysis come from two sources: the French post-electoral survey for 
1978 (BDSP 1978) and the French electoral study for2012 (Sauger, 2012). The latter is a post-election 
survey made during the 2012 elections comprising 2014 interviews, representative of the French 
population registered on the electoral roll. The former is the post-electoral study made in 1978 and 
has data for 4456 individuals. 
 
Figure 4. From social structure to political preferences 
The questionnaires of the two surveys are not identical but possess sufficient common 
elements to have a comparable structure for 1978 and 2012. The position in the social structure will 
be mainly determined by six types of variables: sex, age, occupation, income levels, church 
attendance and the type of living environment. A few additional variables, specific to a survey, will 
also be taken into consideration.  
Men will be the reference category. Five age brackets will be taken into consideration: 18 to 
24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54 (reference category) and over 55. Occupations will be defined with 
the help of the INSEE classifications in an almost identical way for the two surveys: farmers 
(reference category), managers, craftsmen and shopkeepers, high-skill public sector employees, high-
skill private sector employees, medium-skill public sector employees, medium-skill private sector 
employees, foremen and technicians, public sector clerks, private sector clerks, service workers; 
skilled (blue collar) workers, unskilled (blue collar) workers, student, unemployed, retired. For the 
1978 survey only, two additional categories could be taken into consideration: specialised workers (a 
category of unskilled worker executing a simple task in conveyor belt factories) and police and 
security forces. The level of household income is individualised by dividing it by the squared root of 
the size of the household in order to account for possible intra-household economies of scale. The 
survey samples are then divided by deciles, and the first income decile is taken as the reference 
category. The church attendance variable will separate individuals who attend at least twice a month 
from the others (reference category). The living environment will separate those who live in a rural 
area from the others (reference category). 
Position in the social 
structure 
Economic policy 
expectations 
Political preferences 
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Some variables of interest were only available in one of the two surveys. For 1978, the size of 
the firm in which the individual works is considered: small (under 50 employees), medium (50 to 500 
employees, the reference category) and large (over 500 employees). Also, a question asked for the 
opinion on the future of the type of activity the individual was working in: decline, stability (the 
reference category) or expansion. For 2012, the wealth level could be taken into account.  Five 
wealth brackets are considered: under 7,000 Euros (reference category), between 7,000 and 75,000 
Euros, between 75,000 and 150,000 Euros, between 150,000 and 300,000 Euros and over 3000,000 
Euros. Respondents to the 2012 electoral survey are asked whether it would be easy or difficult for 
them or their partner to find another job should they lose the position they have. When the 
respondent has answered that it would be difficult or very difficult for her/himself of partner to find 
aŶotheƌ joď, the ǀaƌiaďle Household͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌisk takes a ǀalue of oŶe, aŶd zeƌo otheƌǁise. 
AŶotheƌ ƋuestioŶ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs the likelihood of a deĐƌease iŶ household͛s iŶĐoŵe ǁithiŶ the Ŷeǆt ϭϮ 
months. If this is considered very likely or likely, the corresponding risk variable takes the value 1. 
The questions relevant for the policy expectations are mostly specific to each survey, but 
relate to general policy matters (taxes, income redistribution, public services, labour market 
regulation...) which are common to the two elections. The selection of questions for inclusion as 
variables in the models are thus based on the consideration of two elements: the relevance for the 
policy debate at the time of the election (e.g. the issue of nationalisations, a central element of the 
left economic program in 1978) and the presence of the same or a related question in the 
questionnaire for the other election (e.g. how positive nationalisations are considered in the 2012 
survey). 
In the 1978, the respondent is asked how favourable he or she would be to a series of 
policies. Four answers are possible: totally opposed, rather opposed, rather in favour, totally in 
favour, which will give as many categorical explanatory variables, ǁith the ͞ƌatheƌ opposed͟ takeŶ as 
the reference category. The policies concerned are the following: suppressing the advantages of 
many in order to reduce social inequalities; extending the nationalised sector even if this implies 
limiting the scope of the private sector; increase taxes to provide free public services (health, 
transports, school, etc.); limit the increase in your standard of living in order to curb inflation; 
prohibit any firing as long as an alternative job is not guaranteed; the establishment of foreign firms 
in France. Another question asks whether the suppression of the right to strike would be grave. Four 
answers are here again possible, according to the degree of gravity. IŶdiǀiduals fiŶdiŶg it ͞ƌatheƌ 
gƌaǀe͟ ǁill ďe the ƌefeƌeŶĐe Đategory. 
In 2012, four degrees of appreciation of the nationalisations are considered, from very 
negative to very positive. ͞FaiƌlǇ Ŷegatiǀe͟ ǁill ďe the ƌefeƌeŶĐe ĐategoƌǇ. For the opposition to the 
single employment contract,20 four answers from totally favourable to totally opposed are available. 
͞Ratheƌ opposed͟ ǁill foƌŵ the ƌefeƌeŶĐe ĐategoƌǇ.  An important social protection reform of the 
Sarkozy presidency concerned the pensions. The reform led to a significant union-led contestation in 
autumn 2010 and one electoral promise of PS candidate François Hollande was to partially reverse it. 
One question of the survey asked the respondent to appreciate the fairness of the reform, grading it 
between 0 and 10. For all variables of that type, the grade itself will be the explanatory variable. Two 
other questions deal with taxation and redistribution. One asks whether the respondent approves or 
disapproves government intervention to reduce income inequalities. Five answers are possible: 
totally agree, rather agree, neither agree nor disagree, rather disagree (reference category), totally 
disagree. Another question asks the degree of approval of an increase in VAT (grading it between 0 
and 10). The issue of increasing the VAT in order to finance social protection, allowing for a decrease 
in social contributions and a drop in the labour cost, had been a debate before and during the 
                                                          
20
 The proposition to replace all open-ended and fixed-term contract by a single open-ended contract with 
diminished protection was made by economists in the early 2000s (Cahuc and Kramarz 2004)and taken up in 
the respective manifestos for the presidential election of Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP) in 2007 and François Bayrou 
(MoDem) in 2012. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.23
10 
 
electoral campaign, opposing Nicolas Sarkozy, who was in favour of it, to the left, opposed to it. 
Finally three questions ask for the respondent position on strengthening the power of the EU vs. the 
power of the French state, increasing or decreasing the number of nuclear plants, and increasing or 
decreasing the number of civil servants. The answers are grades between 0 and 10 for the degree of 
support to the proposition. 
In order to consider possible divides linked to culture and lifestyles, besides those based on 
economic policy issues, as in the now popular bi-dimensional representation of the political 
space(Kitschelt, 1993, 1994), variables reflecting social values have been incorporated in the analysis. 
According to the bi-dimensional view, a new cultural divide, not independent of social structural 
determinants, opposes authoritarian values and communitarian conceptions of justice to the values 
of cultural liberalism, internationalism, and gender equality (Bornschier, 2010). This would split the 
traditional left and right social bases. 
In the 1978 survey, a question concerns the possibility for an under-18 girl to take the pill 
without the consent of her parents. Four answers, from totally opposed to totally favourable were 
possible. The ͞ƌatheƌ opposed͟ ǁill ďe the ƌefeƌeŶĐe ĐategoƌǇ. Another question asked whether the 
respondent would prefer to work more in order to earn more money or to work less even if this 
implies earning less. This question is interesting since the choice to work and earn more will become 
a very popular presidential campaign slogan for Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, aimed at the working classes 
preoccupied with their low purchasing power and taken to appreciate particularly the values of hard 
work as opposed to laziness. Finally a question asked whether school should give the sense of 
discipline and effort or form people with an open and critical mind. Categorical variables 
ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶg ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ the ͞ǁoƌk ŵoƌe to eaƌŶ ŵoƌe͟ aŶd ͞foƌŵ people ǁith aŶ opeŶ ŵiŶd͟ ǁill 
be considered. 
For 2012, social values are identified with the help of four questions, asking about the 
approval with the following propositions: homosexual couples have a right to adopt children; in a 
society, there must be a hierarchy with leaders; the unemployed could find a job if they really 
wanted to; there are too many immigrants in France. Categorical variables corresponding to approval 
will be considered.   
Political preferences are appreciated with the answer to the question about the degree of 
sympathy of the respondent for the different political parties. Taking as a dependent variable the 
degree of sympathy for a party rather than the vote makes it possible to consider the potential 
support rather than the electoral outcome for a single election. Besides, the response rate to the 
sympathy question is usually higher than the corresponding rate for questions about the vote. This is 
particularly true for the 2012 elections where nearly all the respondents (over 97%) have given an 
answer to the question on the degree of sympathy, whereas only 83% have given an answer on their 
vote for the first round of the election. The information content of the sympathy question is also 
higher. Respondents give a grade to all parties whereas the vote goes by definition to one party only. 
Also, a certain degree of strategic voting for the first round can be expected both on the right and on 
the left, leading to a certain blurring of the respective social bases of the different parties and a 
probable underestimation of the potential support of small candidates/parties, the ecologists in 2012 
for instance. 
Data for the following parties are available for 1978: the parti communiste français 
(communist party PCF); the parti socialiste unifié (unified socialist party PSU);21 the far left, not a 
party but a movement composed mostly of Trotskyite parties; the parti socialiste (socialist party PS); 
two parties which compose the UDF, the foƌŵatioŶ of PƌesideŶt GisĐaƌd d͛EstaiŶg: the Centre des 
                                                          
21
 The PSU represented the so-Đalled ͞seĐoŶd left͟ ǁhose oƌigiŶs Đould be found in the opposition both to the 
French colonial wars of the 1950s and to the Soviet Union. It was characterised by an opposition to the 
͞ďuƌeauĐƌatisatioŶ͟ of soĐietǇ. Michel Rocard was First Secretary of the PSU between 1967 and 1973, before 
joining the PS. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.23
11 
 
democrats sociaux (CDS) and the parti républicain (PR); the rassemblement pour la république (post-
Gaullist party RPR). For 2012, the parties were the Front de Gauche (radical left),22 Europe-Ecologie 
les Verts (EELV, ecologists), the PS (mainstream left), the MoDem (Centre), the UMP (mainstream 
right) and the Front National (FN, radical right). Each party was given a grade between 0 and 6 in 
1978 and between 0 and 10 in 2012.   
The distributions of grades for each party are featured in Figures 5 and 6. One can notice the 
oǀeƌall good opiŶioŶ that ƌespoŶdeŶts eǆpƌess oŶ the P“ iŶ ϭϵϳϴ. OŶ aǀeƌage, ͞eǆtƌeŵe͟ paƌties 
gather more low grades than mainstream parties (e.g. the far left in 1978). This is particularly true for 
the FN in 2012; nearly half the respondents give the FN a zero grade. 
The empirical models for 1978 and 2012 are estimated with the maximum likelihood 
method, with probit or ordered probit estimations depending on the variable considered. Ordered 
choices will be taken as categorical variables when they are explanatory variables (e.g. the degree of 
appƌoďatioŶ of goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ to ƌeduĐe iŶeƋualitǇ iŶ the degƌee of sǇŵpathǇ foƌ a paƌtǇ 
equations), except when these choices are a grade between 0 and 10. The linearity of the answer 
scheme makes it acceptable to consider the grade itself and not the grade categories as explanatory 
variables. Grades will be taken as an ordered choice variable when they enter as dependent variables 
in the model (e.g. in the equations determining the influence of the social position on the evaluation 
of the fairness of the pension reform for instance).  
The estimation of the model starts with the inclusion of all possible paths, i.e. all possible 
explanatory variables in every equation. After having estimated the complete models, likelihood ratio 
tests were performed to check the significance of the various explanatory paths within the model 
(i.e. the significance of variable coefficients in the model͛s eƋuatioŶsͿ. The successive application of 
likelihood ratio test led to the rejection at the 5% level of 543 paths for the 1978 model and 588 
paths for the 2012 model. This led to more parsimonious and easily interpretable models than the 
unconstrained models. 
 
                                                          
22
 Strictly speaking not a party but a union of left parties including among others the PCF. 
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Figure 5. Histograms of party grades in 1978. 
 
Figure 6. Histograms of party grades in 2012. 
4. Estimation results 
Estimation results for the restricted models are presented in Tables 1 to 3 for 1978 and 
Tables 4 to 6 for 2012. Starting with the sympathy towards political parties in 1978 (Table 1), one 
notices the existence of a strong divide on economic issues along the traditional left-right opposition: 
nationalisations, industrial relations and social conflict (the right to strike), income inequalities, 
austerity and the fight against inflation as well as employment protection. Left positions on these 
issues were mostly defended by the young, the low and middle incomes, the working classes and 
public sector employees (Tables 2 and 3). On the other side, one found the support of high incomes, 
seniors, churchgoers, managers and shopkeepers, high-skill private sector employees and inhabitants 
of rural areas for right economic policy options. These findings confirm the existence of a traditional 
class-based support for left and right economic policies respectively. One may also note that the 
answers to the question on taxes and free public services, although a classical problem in the political 
economy of public goods,23 very imperfectly reflected this classical opposition. Not only was the 
matter hardly relevant to differentiate the support to the different parties, but also the social base 
for this type of policy was particularly difficult to identify or interpret according to income 
inequalities (table2).  
  
                                                          
23
 See for instance Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) or Persson and Tabellini (2000), chapter 3. 
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 PCF PSU Far left PS PR CDS RPR 
Suppress the advantages of many to reduce social inequalities 
Totally in 
favour  
 0.167*** 
(0.048) 
 
 0.140*** 
(0.048) 
 
 -0.145*** 
(0.049) 
 
-0.152*** 
(0.050) 
 
Broaden and develop the nationalised sector 
 
 
Totally against -0.166*** 
(0.064) 
 
-0.141** 
(0.065) 
 
 -0.431*** 
(0.059) 
 
 0.200*** 
(0.064) 
 
0.319*** 
(0.066) 
 
Rather in 
favour 
0.446*** 
(0.061) 
 
0.347*** 
(0.060) 
 
0.394*** 
(0.057) 
 
0.414*** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.608*** 
(0.054) 
 
-0.427*** 
(0.061) 
 
-0.532*** 
(0.062) 
 
Totally in 
favour 
0.989*** 
(0.076) 
 
0.425*** 
(0.072) 
 
0.713*** 
(0.068) 
 
 -0.953*** 
(0.069) 
 
-0.661*** 
(0.076) 
 
-0.758*** 
(0.077) 
 
Raise taxes for free public services 
 
 
Rather in 
favour 
    -0.109** 
(0.054) 
 
  
Totally in 
favour 
      -0.175** 
(0.080) 
 
Limit your standard of living to curb inflation 
 
Totally against 
0.252*** 
(0.052) 
 
0.169*** 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.218*** 
(0.051) 
 
  
Rather in 
favour 
  -0.168*** 
(0.052) 
  
  0.201*** 
(0.050) 
 
 
Totally in 
favour 
     0.216*** 
(0.073) 
 
 
Forbid layoffs until a new job is found 
 
 
Totally against 
 -0.204** 
(0.081) 
 
-0.213** 
(0.089) 
 
   0.251*** 
(0.085) 
 
Rather in 
favour 
     -0.286*** 
(0.065) 
 
 
Totally in 
favour 
0.188*** 
(0.050) 
 
  0.138*** 
(0.049) 
 
-0.241*** 
(0.049) 
 
-0.440*** 
(0.063) 
 
 
The establishment of foreign firms 
 
  
Totally against 
0.187*** 
(0.053) 
 
      
Rather in 
favour 
 
 
 
 
-0.164*** 
(0.056) 
 
    
Suppress the right to strike 
 
 
Very grave 0.426*** 
(0.051) 
 
0.371*** 
(0.055) 
 
0.215*** 
(0.053) 
 
0.312*** 
(0.053) 
 
-0.396*** 
(0.050) 
 
-0.436*** 
(0.049) 
 
-0.460*** 
(0.055) 
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Rather not 
grave  
 
 
-0.236*** 
(0.077) 
 
 -0.279*** 
(0.078) 
 
 
 
 
 0.310*** 
(0.080) 
 
Not grave at 
all 
-0.248** 
(0.105) 
 
-0.257** 
(0.105) 
 
 -0.390*** 
(0.104) 
 
0.238** 
(0.100) 
 
 0.272** 
(0.106) 
 
A minor girl could take the pill 
 
 
Rather agree 
   0.170*** 
(0.053) 
 
   
Totally agree 
 0.116** 
(0.049) 
 
     
Work more to 
earn more 
 -0.194*** 
(0.047) 
 
-0.155*** 
(0.050) 
 
   0.248*** 
(0.048) 
 
School should 
opeŶ people͛s 
mind 
0.175*** 
(0.050) 
 
0.282*** 
(0.049) 
 
0.187*** 
(0.054) 
 
 -0.112** 
(0.051) 
 
-0.146*** 
(0.050) 
 
-0.302*** 
(0.051) 
 
Age        
18 to 24 
0.196*** 
(0.068) 
 
 0.476*** 
(0.072) 
 
-0.138** 
(0.066) 
 
-0.440*** 
(0.073) 
 
-0.259*** 
(0.071) 
 
-0.181*** 
(0.070) 
 
25 to 34 
  0.234*** 
(0.057) 
 
 -0.216*** 
(0.058) 
 
  
35 to 44 
 0.188*** 
(0.057) 
 
  -0.173*** 
(0.063) 
 
  
Over 55 
     0.272*** 
(0.055) 
 
 
Lives in a rural 
area 
 -0.216***      
 (0.070)      
Churchgoer  
-0.395*** 
(0.067) 
 
-0.144** 
(0.064) 
 
-0.215*** 
(0.072) 
 
-0.399*** 
(0.065) 
 
0.294*** 
(0.064) 
 
0.459*** 
(0.064) 
 
0.346*** 
(0.066) 
 
Income       
6th decile   -0.295*** 
(0.084) 
 
 
 
 
   
7th decile   -0.309*** 
(0.083) 
 
    
8th decile  
 
 
 
-0.302*** 
(0.086) 
 
    
9th decile   -0.354*** 
(0.083) 
 
    
10th decile   -0.228*** 
(0.081) 
 
-0.284*** 
(0.072) 
 
  
 
 
 
Occupation        
Craftsman, 
shopkeeper 
     -0.203** 
(0.096) 
 
 
Private sector 
intellectual 
profession 
-0.473** 
(0.201) 
 
      
Public sector 
intellectual 
profession 
 0.448*** 
(0.095) 
 
 0.193** 
(0.098) 
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Public sector 
clerk 
 0.284*** 
(0.076) 
 
 0.173** 
(0.079) 
 
-0.203*** 
(0.076) 
 
  
technicians 
  -0.321*** 
(0.105) 
 
0.222** 
(0.097) 
 
   
Skilled 
workers 
0.400*** 
(0.082) 
 
    -0.228*** 
(0.078) 
 
 
specialised 
workers 
0.351*** 
(0.084) 
 
 0.223*** 
(0.086) 
 
 -0.258*** 
(0.082) 
 
 -0.247*** 
(0.085) 
 
 
 
workers 
0.363*** 
(0.099) 
 
 0.265*** 
(0.100) 
 
 -0.222** 
(0.096) 
 
-0.212** 
(0.095) 
 
-0.238** 
(0.099) 
 
Police or 
church 
  -0.586** 
(0.233) 
 
  0.416** 
(0.193) 
 
 
student 
 
 
 
 
   0.474*** 
(0.159) 
 
 
Works in a 
declining 
industry 
0.171*** 
(0.065) 
 
  0.201*** 
(0.065) 
 
-0.144** 
(0.064) 
 
 -0.217*** 
(0.066) 
 
Table 1. Support to political parties in 1978. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
As expected, ͞Đultuƌal͟ divides reflected only in part the economic policy oppositions. The 
school issue split the electorate along traditional left-right lines although, when one turns to the 
social support for this question, one notices a skill- and income-based divide cross-cutting the usual 
partition of the left and right social bases. This is also true, but to a lesser extent, for the ͞ǁoƌk ŵoƌe 
to eaƌŶ ŵoƌe͟ Ƌuestion. Other cultural issues mattered less for the left-right opposition: the pill 
question for instance. Partisans and opponents on this issue were divided mostly according to age 
and income levels, the young and more affluent respondents being more liberal than the others. 
Also, the literature stressing the emergence of a cultural divide has insisted on the 
consequences it would have for the left (Lipset, 1981; Kitschelt, 1988) splittiŶg the ͞old left͟, focused 
on economic issue and with a social base consisting of traditional working class groups, from a ͞Ŷeǁ 
left͟, with a social base composed of more educated and better off individuals, more concerned with 
post-materialist values. The results of Tables 1 to 3 show that societal issues produced a rift within 
the traditional base of the right as well, based on skills and income levels. The better-off and more 
skilled fraction of the right social base, high-skill private sector employees and high income 
individuals, sided with the better-off and more skilled fraction of the left base on these cultural issues 
against a fraction of the traditional base of the right (shopkeepers, churchgoers, seniors...). This 
proximity was limited to cultural issues and did not extend to economic policy matters. 
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 Suppress the 
advantages 
of many 
Broaden and 
develop the 
nationalised 
sector 
Raise taxes for 
free public 
services 
Limit your 
standard of 
living to curb 
inflation 
Forbid layoffs 
until a new job 
is found 
woman   -0.120*** 
(0.037) 
 
  
age      
18 to 24 
 0.201*** 
(0.060) 
 
0.144** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.132** 
(0.060) 
 
0.208*** 
(0.064) 
 
25 to 34 
  0.113** 
(0.044) 
 
-0.156*** 
(0.046) 
 
 
Over 55 
 -0.186*** 
(0.045) 
 
   
Lives in a rural 
area 
    -0.294*** 
(0.057) 
 
retired    -0.146*** 
(0.052) 
 
-0.172*** 
(0.053) 
 
Churchgoer  -0.201*** 
(0.051) 
 
-0.555*** 
(0.056) 
 
 0.332*** 
(0.051) 
 
-0.343*** 
(0.053) 
 
income      
4th decile    0.169*** 
(0.065) 
 
 
5th decile    0.210*** 
(0.064) 
 
 
6th decile    0.272*** 
(0.068) 
 
 
7th decile -0.131** 
(0.064) 
 
  0.249*** 
(0.069) 
 
-0.155** 
(0.069) 
 
8th decile  -0.166** 
(0.067) 
 
 0.325*** 
(0.069) 
 
-0.191*** 
(0.071) 
 
9th decile    0.245*** 
(0.070) 
 
 
10th decile -0.152** 
(0.062) 
 
-0.258*** 
(0.065) 
 
 0.503*** 
(0.067) 
 
 
occupation      
Manager 
 -0.529*** 
(0.143) 
 
  -0.842*** 
(0.139) 
 
Craftsman, 
shopkeeper 
 -0.319*** 
(0.090) 
 
-0.263*** 
(0.082) 
 
 -0.461*** 
(0.086) 
 
Public sector 
intellectual 
profession 
 0.285*** 
(0.086) 
 
  0.183** 
(0.088) 
 
Private sector 
high-skilled 
 -0.299*** 
(0.096) 
 
  -0.350*** 
(0.095) 
 
Public sector 
clerk 
 0.238*** 
(0.071) 
 
   
technicians  0.211**    
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(0.088) 
 
Skilled workers 
0.144** 
(0.066) 
 
0.355*** 
(0.071) 
 
 -0.234*** 
(0.065) 
 
0.355*** 
(0.074) 
 
specialised 
workers 
 0.281*** 
(0.073) 
 
-0.157** 
(0.065) 
 
-0.290*** 
(0.066) 
 
0.252*** 
(0.074) 
 
workers 
 0.469*** 
(0.084) 
 
 0.161* 
(0.082) 
 
 
Service workers 
 0.314*** 
(0.086) 
 
  0.306*** 
(0.086) 
 
Police or 
church 
0.334** 
(0.163) 
 
    
Student 
0.309** 
(0.150) 
 
    
Works in a 
small firm 
 -0.188*** 
(0.046) 
 
-0.093** 
(0.041) 
 
 -0.173*** 
(0.046) 
 
Works in a 
declining 
industry 
0.136** 
(0.055) 
 
0.266*** 
(0.056) 
 
 -0.134** 
(0.054) 
 
0.124** 
(0.060) 
 
Table 2. Policy expectations in 1978 (a). Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
The direct influence of social structural characteristics on party support was also strong. 
Church attendance and age did not only strongly influence policy preferences or cultural values, they 
also directly influenced the degree of sympathy towards one or the other party. Churchgoers were 
strong supporters of the right, and the young were broadly favourable to the left. The working 
classes were strongly supporting the left, mostly the communist party and the far left. The level of 
income played a more moderate role, influencing only the degree of sympathy towards the far left, 
which was strongly decreasing with affluence. The causes for the strength of this direct influence 
may be either the inability of the questions on economic policy and cultural values to adequately 
reflect the expectations of the electorate, or the strong links between social structure and party 
sympathies independently of specific economic or cultural issues. 
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 Establishment 
of foreign   
firms 
Suppression 
of the right to 
strike 
Pill for minor 
girl 
Work more 
to earn more 
School should 
favour critical 
sense 
woman  0.295*** 
(0.043) 
 
-0.125*** 
(0.040) 
 
-0.133*** 
(0.045) 
 
-0.115** 
(0.049) 
 
age      
18 to 24 0.331*** 
(0.060) 
 
 0.836*** 
(0.071) 
 
0.285*** 
(0.071) 
 
0.917*** 
(0.080) 
 
25 to 34 0.244*** 
(0.047) 
 
 0.631*** 
(0.053) 
 
 0.527*** 
(0.063) 
 
35 to 44 0.333*** 
(0.052) 
 
 0.232*** 
(0.057) 
 
 0.178*** 
(0.069) 
 
Lives in a rural 
area 
-0.108** 
(0.054) 
 
0.244*** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.149*** 
(0.056) 
 
0.140** 
(0.062) 
 
-0.172** 
(0.069) 
 
Unemployed  -0.192** 
(0.093) 
 
0.300*** 
(0.092) 
 
-0.206** 
(0.099) 
 
0.374*** 
(0.102) 
 
retired  0.173*** 
(0.051) 
 
-0.125** 
(0.059) 
 
0.300*** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.220*** 
(0.073) 
 
Churchgoer 0.284*** 
(0.052) 
 
0.341*** 
(0.052) 
 
-0.585*** 
(0.054) 
 
-0.145** 
(0.059) 
 
-0.243*** 
(0.066) 
 
Income      
6th decile   0.150** 
(0.067) 
 
  
7th decile   0.270*** 
(0.068) 
 
 0.221*** 
(0.077) 
 
8th decile   0.376*** 
(0.070) 
 
-0.278*** 
(0.076) 
 
 
9th decile  -0.177** 
(0.072) 
 
0.274*** 
(0.072) 
 
-0.201** 
(0.078) 
 
0.280*** 
(0.082) 
 
10th decile 0.152** 
(0.062) 
 
 0.462*** 
(0.069) 
 
-0.244*** 
(0.073) 
 
0.411*** 
(0.078) 
 
occupation      
Manager 
0.432*** 
(0.130) 
 
    
Private sector 
intellectual 
profession 
 -0.546*** 
(0.187) 
 
0.444** 
(0.178) 
 
-0.722*** 
(0.207) 
 
0.994*** 
(0.209) 
 
Public sector 
intellectual 
profession 
 -0.970*** 
(0.098) 
 
0.373*** 
(0.086) 
 
-1.060*** 
(0.106) 
 
1.073*** 
(0.103) 
 
Private sector 
high-skilled 
0.365*** 
(0.091) 
 
 0.234** 
(0.096) 
 
 0.389*** 
(0.112) 
 
Public sector 
high-skilled 
 -0.380*** 
(0.125) 
 
  0.379*** 
(0.138) 
 
Private sector  -0.251*** 0.183***  0.215*** 
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clerk (0.061) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.070) 
 
Public sector clerk 
 -0.375*** 
(0.074) 
 
 -0.242*** 
(0.075) 
 
0.346*** 
(0.082) 
 
technicians 
 -0.527*** 
(0.102) 
 
 -0.219** 
(0.098) 
 
0.317*** 
(0.106) 
 
Skilled workers 
 -0.377*** 
(0.077) 
 
   
specialised 
workers 
 -0.157** 
(0.073) 
 
  0.176** 
(0.080) 
 
workers 
 -0.243*** 
(0.080) 
 
   
Student 
 -1.223*** 
(0.191) 
 
0.606*** 
(0.169) 
 
-0.862*** 
(0.171) 
 
1.432*** 
(0.242) 
 
Works in a large 
firm 
 -0.197*** 
(0.060) 
 
 -0.200*** 
(0.061) 
 
0.165*** 
(0.064) 
 
Works in a small 
firm 
 0.211*** 
(0.045) 
 
   
Works in a 
declining industry 
-0.139** 
(0.054) 
 
-0.119** 
(0.059) 
 
 -0.209*** 
(0.064) 
 
 
Table3. Policy expectations in 1978 (b). Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Results for 2012 (Table 4 to 6) also show strong economic policy-based divides between the 
left and the right. Somewhat surprisingly considering the evolution of the past decades, the issue of 
nationalisations, central to the economic policy debate of the late 1970s, still represent a source of 
opposition between the left and the right. One must however bear in mind that the financial crisis of 
2008 has given rise to a renewed interest for the question of the nationalisation of the banking 
sector for instance. The difference with respect to 1978 is that the support to nationalisations is less 
clearly identifiable in terms of social structural characteristics. In 1978, nationalisations were 
favoured by the traditional social base of the left (working classes, public servants) and strongly 
disliked by the traditional social base of the right (churchgoers, seniors, high incomes). In 2012, fewer 
groups emerge as clear opponents or supporters of nationalisations. These are still strongly 
supported by public servants and opposed by high-income individuals, but the specific support of the 
working classes for instance seems to be less strong. This is not the consequence of a general lack of 
interest or support however. Remarkably, a majority of respondents express positive opinions on 
that topic, which was not the case in 1978.24 The lack of specific support of the working classes for 
nationalisations is therefore the consequence of other categories becoming on average more 
favourable to them rather than the result of a declining inclination of workers for that policy option. 
Other issues reflect the classical left-right economic policy divide: the appreciation of the 
pension reform, the opposition to state intervention for reducing inequalities or the extent of the 
public sector (increasing the number of civil servants). The social structural divides on such issues are 
also as expected: opposing high- income individuals to the bulk of the wage-earners. New themes, 
such as the opposition to nuclear energy, are also integrated in this divide. As can be seen in Table 4, 
this supposedly post-materialist issue divides the electorate along very traditional left-right lines. 
Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, oŶe ĐaŶŶot ƌead aŶ oppositioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the ͞Ŷeǁ͟ aŶd the ͞old͟ left aĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
expectations derived from the literature on this topic that states the existence for left parties of a 
trade-off ďetǁeeŶ ͞tƌaditioŶal͟ left eĐoŶoŵiĐ poliĐǇ optioŶs aŶd ͞Ŷeǁ͟ Đultuƌal oƌ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal 
                                                          
24
 Only 35% of the respondents express a negative opinion on nationalizations. 
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themes.25 The nuclear energy issue is without surprise an important determinant of the sympathy 
towards the ecologist party (EELV). But if one considers the Front de Gauche, which includes the 
communist party, as the paƌagoŶ of the ͞old͟ left, ďeĐause of its positioŶs oŶ the tƌaditioŶal 
economic policy divide, one sees that opposition to nuclear energy mattered more for its support 
thaŶ it did foƌ the soĐialist paƌtǇ, ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ less foĐussed oŶ allegedlǇ ͞old left͟ eĐoŶoŵiĐ poliĐǇ siŶĐe 
the U-turn of 1983. Some societal values issues do not cross-cut the left-right divide either: the 
appreciation of the will of the unemployed to find a job and the sentiment on immigration. The link 
with the economic policy cleavage is much weaker in the case of the question on the adoption right 
of homosexual couples, but one sees nevertheless that a favourable position of this issue brings 
more sympathy towards the Front de Gauche. This suggests that ͞old͟ aŶd ͞Ŷeǁ͟ left politiĐs are not 
as substitute to one another as one may think.26 
Contrary to what could have been expected on the basis of the new themes included in 
MaƌiŶe Le PeŶ͛s ŵaŶifesto, the suppoƌt foƌ the FN appeaƌs to ďe ďased oŶ ǀeƌǇ tƌaditioŶal ƌight 
economic policy pƌefeƌeŶĐes ─ Ŷegatiǀe opiŶioŶ of ŶatioŶalisatioŶs of state iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ agaiŶst 
iŶĐoŵe iŶeƋualities, suppoƌt of the ŶuĐleaƌ pƌogƌaŵ ─ aŶd ͞authoƌitaƌiaŶ͟ soĐietal ǀalues the 
uŶeŵploǇed Đould fiŶd a joď, theƌe aƌe too ŵaŶǇ iŵŵigƌaŶts ─ ;Taďle ϰͿ. The latteƌ is not surprising, 
but the former questions the importance of the U-turn made by the FN on its economic policy stance 
(Shields 2013). The FN had promoted an opposition to public intervention in the economy since its 
foundation in the 1970s and adopted an ultraliberal position on issues such as taxation and 
redistribution, advocating a flat income tax and a limitation of the public expenditure to 25% of the 
GDP, all this coupled with a nationalist attitude with respect to foreign trade and labour immigration. 
Only in the mid-2000s did the economic discourse of the FN change, adopting some themes of the 
left critique of neoliberalism such as the negative consequences of European integration for the 
ability to implement a pro-active budget policy, and the impact on growth and employment, or for 
the possibility to keep a generous social protection system. The results documented in Table 4 point 
out that this change has had little consequences on the pattern of support for the FN. 27 
A few issues lead to a profile of sympathy towards the different parties which departs from 
the traditional left-right opposition. The first one is European integration. Support for an increase in 
the power of the EU against the power of the national state is likely to bring support to EELV, the PS 
and the MoDem. Opposition to such an evolution brings strong support to the FN. The FdG is in an 
intermediate position in this respect. The VAT increase is another topic that breaks the traditional 
political alliances. Supporters of this policy measure are more likely to feel sympathy for EELV, 
MoDem and UMP. Finally, the importance for society to have a hierarchy with leaders, an issue 
which should be representative of the cultural divide (Kriesi 2010), does not lead to a support for a 
priori authoƌitaƌiaŶ paƌties suĐh as the FN oƌ eǀeŶ supposed iŶĐaƌŶatioŶs of ͞old͟ politiĐs suĐh as the 
FdG, but to mainstream left, right and Centre parties UMP, PS and MoDem. 
 
  
                                                          
25
 For instance, analysing media content on the political supply, Bornschier (2010) found that mainstream social 
democratic parties had undergone a New left transformation. 
26
 See also Rohrschneider (1993) on this point. 
27
 Mayer (2013) also finds that MaƌiŶe Le PeŶ͛s suppoƌts aƌe ideologiĐallǇ aŶd soĐiallǇ ǀeƌǇ siŵilaƌ to heƌ 
fatheƌ͛s. 
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Front de 
gauche 
 Europe 
Ecologie – 
Les Verts 
Parti 
socialiste MoDem UMP 
Front 
National 
No adoption for 
homosexual couples -0.164**      
(0.065)      
The unemployed 
cannot find work  
0.214*** 0.127** 0.252*** 0.209*** -0.366*** -0.304*** 
(0.066) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.067) 
No need for a hierarchy 
with leaders in society 
  -0.230** -0.213** -0.398***  
  (0.103) (0.106) (0.108)  
Immigrants are not too 
many in France 
0.490*** 0.437*** 0.325***  -0.401*** -1.078*** 
(0.072) (0.069) (0.069)  (0.069) (0.081) 
Single employment contract      
Strongly in favour 
    0.228**  
    (0.106)  
Strongly against  
0.147**      
(0.072)      
“aƌkozǇ͛s peŶsioŶ 
reform was fair 
-0.103***  -0.071*** 0.033*** 0.165***  
(0.011)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)  
government's intervention to reduce income  inequalities    
Strongly approve  
0.142** 0.300*** 0.171***  -0.203*** -0.229*** 
(0.066) (0.062) (0.064)  (0.062) (0.067) 
Rather disapprove  
-0.513***  -0.380***    
(0.133)  (0.126)    
Strongly disapprove  
-0.393*** -0.249** -0.355***    
(0.128) (0.118) (0.118)    
Increase VAT  0.032**  0.075*** 0.043***  
 (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016)  
Increase the power of 
the EU 
 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.045***  -0.084*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.012) 
Keep on building 
nuclear plants 
-0.043*** -0.110***  -0.029** 0.047*** 0.039*** 
(0.012) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Increase the number of 
civil servants 
0.065*** 0.056*** 0.061***  -0.073***  
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.014)  
Wealth:  over 300 000 
Euros 
-0.286***  -0.170**    
(0.083)  (0.078)    
Income: 3rd decile  0.262**     
 (0.105)     
Occupation       
High-skill public service      -0.365** 
     (0.147) 
High-skill private sector      -0.319** 
     (0.146) 
Public sector clerk    0.201**   
   (0.094)   
Unemployed     -0.271**  
    (0.113)  
Risk of income loss -0.188*** -0.126** -0.223***   0.149** 
(0.064) (0.062) (0.061)   (0.067) 
women  0.166***   0.173***  
 (0.059)   (0.060)  
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Age       
 18 to 24   -0.323***    
  (0.116)    
25 to 34    0.240***   
   (0.091)   
35 to 44    0.167**   
   (0.075)   
over 55      -0.280*** 
     (0.067) 
Churchgoer -0.302**      
(0.123)      
Lives in a rural area  -0.120*     
 (0.062)     
Table 4. Support to political parties in 2012. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
A notable difference with the 1978 situation is the weak direct importance of some social 
structural characteristics on party support. Individuals with high wealth levels are still more likely to 
dislike left parties (FdG); respondents between 25 and 45 are more favourable to the MoDem than 
others; high-skill individuals dislike the FN. The support of the working classes and the young to the 
left is no longer observable independently of the economic policy preferences and societal values. 
This may be the result of a better design of the questions on economic policy or cultural values in the 
2012 survey, which would have a better explanatory power of the sympathies towards parties than 
in 1978, or a consequence of the so-called de-alignment or de-structuring of the traditional 
relationship between social structural determinants and political preferences.28 
Turning to the support to the economic policy options, the cleavages, splitting the working 
classes and the public servants apart from the managers, shopkeepers and private sector high- and 
medium-skill employees, are more or less unchanged on a certain number of key economic policy 
issues: pension reform, state intervention against income inequality or the increase in VAT. The 
working classes appear somewhat less supportive of nationalisations or the extension of the public 
service than public sector employees, and they are not particularly sensitive to the nuclear energy 
issue. They do not particularly disapprove the need for hierarchy in society, unlike public servants, or 
anti-immigration positions. Furthermore, they express negative opinions on the job search effort of 
the unemployed, similarly to shopkeepers. The same configuration is found on the question about 
the extension of the power of the EU, shopkeepers and the working classes are opposed to it; 
managers and high- and medium-skill employees are in favour of it.  
The core social base of the right, more limited than that of the left in 1978, appears relatively 
stable, composed of churchgoers, managers, craftsmen and shopkeepers, high skill private sector 
employees and individuals with high incomes or wealth levels. They express unsurprising policy 
preferences: against nationalisations and the extension of the public sector, in favour of the pension 
ƌefoƌŵ aŶd a VAT ƌise, disappƌoǀiŶg state͛s iŶtervention against inequalities; they have negative 
opinions of the job search effort of the unemployed and consider positively the existence of a 
hierarchy in society. 
 
  
                                                          
28
 E.g. Dalton et al. (1984), Dalton (1988), Franklin et al. (1992). 
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Opposed to 
the single 
employment 
contract 
Pension 
reform 
 
Against 
state͛s 
interventio
n on 
inequality 
Increase 
VAT 
Increase 
the 
power of 
the EU 
Nuclear 
energy 
Wealth       
Over 300,000 
Euros 
-0.207*** 0.169**  0.279*** 0.216*** 0.316*** 
(0.077) (0.074)  (0.078) (0.069) (0.081) 
150,000 to 
300,000 Euros 
  0.152** 0.150**  0.233*** 
  (0.064) (0.063)  (0.069) 
75,000 to 150,000 
Euros 
     0.176** 
     (0.088) 
7,000 to 75,000 
Euros 
     0.155** 
     (0.072) 
Income       
 4th decile     -0.153**  
     (0.077)  
 5th decile     -0.348*** 0.363*** 
     (0.107) (0.107) 
 6th decile  0.181**  0.191**  0.151** 
  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.075) 
7th decile  0.000  0.378***  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.108)  (0.000) 
 8th decile  0.192**  0.286***  0.000 
  (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.000) 
 9th decile  0.304***  0.295***  0.251*** 
  (0.086)  (0.088)  (0.085) 
 10th decile -0.241** 0.459*** 0.395*** 0.340***  0.285*** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.098) (0.104)  (0.098) 
Occupation       
Craftsman, 
shopkeeper  0.274**  0.000   
  (0.118)  (0.000)   
Manager  0.660*** 0.577** 0.650*** 0.608***  
  (0.220) (0.227) (0.216) (0.227)  
High-skill public 
service    0.000 0.425*** -0.400*** 
    (0.000) (0.098) (0.100) 
High-skill private 
sector  0.378*** 0.433*** 0.345*** 0.458*** 0.000 
  (0.109) (0.113) (0.111) (0.105) (0.000) 
Medium-skill 
public 0.377***   0.000 0.391*** -0.565*** 
 (0.093)   (0.000) (0.086) (0.086) 
Medium skill 
private   0.283** 0.265**   
   (0.125) (0.120)   
Private sector clerk       
       
Service workers  -0.371***   0.000   
 (0.118)   (0.000)   
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Unskilled worker 0.234**   0.000   
 (0.107)   (0.000)   
student    0.394*** 0.493***  
    (0.147) (0.151)  
Unemployed  -0.299***     
  (0.103)     
Former 
unemployed  -0.106* -0.131** 0.000  -0.213*** 
  (0.054) (0.056) (0.000)  (0.053) 
Retired    0.186*** 0.144*** 0.241*** 
    (0.053) (0.051) (0.054) 
Risk of income loss 
 
-0.299*** 
(0.053) 
 
 -0.203*** -0.162***  
    (0.052) (0.052)  
Employment risk       
       
Woman    -0.206***   
    (0.051)   
Age        
18 to 24   0.490***    
   (0.109)    
 25 to 34   0.328***    
   (0.082)    
35 to 44   0.309***    
   (0.070)    
 over 55 -0.390***    0.144***  
 (0.055)    (0.051)  
Churchgoer  -0.264*** 0.410***    0.252*** 
 (0.099) (0.089)    (0.089) 
Lives in a rural area     -0.112**  
     (0.052)  
Table 5. Policy expectations in 2012 (a). Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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 Natonalisa
tions 
Increase 
the number 
of civil 
servants 
Homosexua
ls͛ adoptioŶ 
rights 
Unemployed 
could find a 
job 
No need 
for 
hierarchy 
in society 
Not too 
many 
immigrants 
Income       
2nd decile    -0.344***   
    (0.093)   
4th decile    0.000   
    (0.000)   
 5th decile    -0.235**  -0.438*** 
    (0.095)  (0.155) 
 6th decile -0.178**   -0.418***   
 (0.082)   (0.135)   
9th decile -0.207**   -0.234**   
 (0.092)   (0.095)   
10th decile -0.438*** -0.405***     
 (0.101) (0.091)     
Occupation       
Craftsman, 
shopkeeper 
 -0.277**  -0.328**   
 (0.117)  (0.145)   
High-skill public 
service 
0.302*** 0.433*** -0.788*** 0.814*** 0.595*** 1.008*** 
(0.113) (0.101) (0.132) (0.140) (0.143) (0.125) 
High-skill private 
sector 
 0.000 -0.486*** 0.000 0.000 0.796*** 
 (0.000) (0.136) (0.000) (0.000) (0.132) 
Medium-skill 
public 
0.385*** 0.421*** -0.705*** 0.509*** 0.453*** 1.050*** 
(0.097) (0.087) (0.117) (0.112) (0.128) (0.108) 
Medium skill 
private 
  -0.312** 0.000  0.000 
  (0.154) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Foreman, 
technician 
  0.000 0.000  0.532*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.131) 
Public sector 
clerk 
  -0.200* 0.000   
  (0.104) (0.000)   
Private sector 
clerk 
  -0.259** 0.000   
  (0.107) (0.000)   
Service workers    -0.371***   
   (0.137)   
Skilled worker    -0.252**   
    (0.098)   
Unskilled worker    -0.271**   
   (0.120)   
student    0.574***   
    (0.185)   
Unemployed    0.338***   
    (0.127)   
Former 
unemployed 
0.127** 0.171***  0.247*** 0.236***  
(0.057) (0.051)  (0.067) (0.085)  
Retired   0.354***   -0.220*** 
   (0.080)   (0.084) 
Risk of income -0.120** -0.139***  0.237***  -0.149** 
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loss (0.058) (0.052)  (0.066)  (0.068) 
Employment risk  0.109**     
 (0.052)     
Woman  0.125** -0.284***    
  (0.050) (0.067)    
Age       
 18 to 24  0.246** -0.726***  0.642*** 0.519*** 
  (0.101) (0.142)  (0.143) (0.135) 
 25 to 34   -0.396***   0.321*** 
   (0.106)   (0.106) 
35 to 44   -0.433***   0.246*** 
   (0.093)   (0.094) 
Churchgoer   -0.291*** 0.706***  -0.378**  
 (0.088) (0.117)  (0.178)  
Lives in a rural 
area 
 -0.126**  -0.173***  -0.195*** 
 (0.052)  (0.064)  (0.068) 
Table 6. Policy expectations in 1978 (a). Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
To sum up, a large part of the traditional economic policy opposition between the left and 
the right is still very much present in 2012. A few issues have led to divides that cross-cut the 
traditional opposition between the social bases of the left and the right: the right for homosexual 
couples to adopt children, the attitude towards immigration and European integration. One observes 
on these issues a divide based on occupation and income that unites the high-skilled and affluent 
fractions of the left and right social bases to their more popular fractions. However, some cultural 
issues lead to divides which parallel the left-right opposition on economic policy.  
5. Interpreting the political crisis 
These results shed some light on the difficulties experienced by the successive left and right 
government coalitions over the past four decades. Following a popular line of argument at the time, 
the victory of the left in 1981 was interpreted by its central actor, François Mitterrand, in the 
following terms: the political majority had caught up with the sociological majority. The 
interpretation was that the 5th Republic had been inhabited by an increasing tension between 
economic modernisation and archaic political and social structures (Gauron 1983). Started after the 
Second World War, the rapid transformation of a still largely rural society into an industrial and 
urban capitalism called for a social-democratic evolution which the 5th republic had for the most part 
tried to prevent, particularly after 1970, when the conservative forces increasingly turned towards a 
neoliberal and authoritarian conception of society (Gauron 1988). The contradictions between on the 
one hand an economic modernisation movement which deeply altered the social structure and the 
power relations between social groups, and on the other hand conservative forces which prevented a 
social and political evolution which would hurt their interests and clash with their values had given 
bursts of tension such as May 1968 and fuelled social conflict and an intense political opposition 
between the right and left during the 1970s.  
But this contradiction was not the exclusive of the right, it was common to all the 
͞ŵodeƌŶists͟, from the left or the right. GauƌoŶ ;ϭϵϴϯͿ defiŶes ͞ŵodeƌŶisŵ͟ as a paƌtiĐulaƌ foƌŵ of 
ideology adopted by a generation that had refused the defeat of 1940 and was opposed to both 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ ͞MalthusiaŶisŵ͟ aŶd the ƌisk of a ĐoŵŵuŶist doŵiŶatioŶ. The modernists tried in the 
post-War period to adapt the economic structure of France to the modern evolution of capitalism, 
including an opening to the world competition and a rapid industrialisation, but refused at the same 
time at least all the social and political consequences of this modernisation since it would have given 
the working classes, and in particular their main political party the PCF, a role that they were not 
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prepared to admit. The most that modernists would accept in that direction was ͞social dialogue͟, 
i.e. negotiation within certain intangible economic and power structures. The figurehead of 
modernism was Pierre Mendès-France, whose influence on the French political life, both on the left 
and on the right, extended far beyond his brief stint as a President of the Council of Ministers for a 
few months in 1954-55, a period during which he refused to accept the support of the communist 
deputies. The political isolation of the PCF, condemned to stay outside of any governing coalition was 
considered by François Mitterrand as the main reason for the political instability of the 4th Republic 
and the impossibility for the left to govern durably.29 
The contradiction between the evolution of the economic and social structures promoted by 
the modernists and the refusal of some of the most significant social and political consequences 
explains the failure of the left modernisation led by Pierre Mendès-France during the 4th Republic 
(Gauron 1983). The intensification of this contradiction during the 5th Republic explains the failure of 
the right in 1981. The strategy of a political alliance between the PS and the PCF, adopted during the 
1970s, was the recognition that a modernisation project excluding the working classes would be a 
dead end. The victory of the left in 1981 was therefore seen as a much delayed alignment of the 
social and political realities to the unavoidable consequences of the evolution of capitalism. 
This diagnostic of a match between the sociological and political majorities had, according to 
Lipietz (1984) for instance, the consequence to lead the left to believe that the problem of its social 
base was already solved, neglecting the tensions within the left bloc between on the one hand the 
expectations of a state-controlled economy protecting existing jobs, and on the other hand the 
demands for autonomy and an alternative mode of development. However, the findings exposed in 
the previous section show that these tensions were not dominant in 1978. The left social bloc was 
relatively compact around the working classes and the public sector employees, with expectations of 
a ͞tƌaditioŶal͟ left policy. In the late 1970s, the social base of the left had strong expectations of an 
economic program based on the extension of social protection and a greater control of the economy 
by the state as well as a macroeconomic policy favouring the growth of employment and real wage 
for the majority of the wage-earners. The left parties were, until 1982-1983, quite radical in their 
principles. The PS still kept the break-up with capitalism as one of its aims in its 1980 manifesto and 
advocated in October 1981 (i.e. after the electoral victories of May and June) a gradual break-up with 
the dominant order (Beaud 1985).  
The change in focus of the economic policy of the left government initiated after June 1982 
was followed by the more brutal U-turn of March 1983, which marked the adoption of an austerity 
policy, tagged ͞ƌigouƌ͟ iŶ oƌdeƌ to ĐoŶĐeal the pƌoǆiŵitǇ of the Ŷeǁ eĐoŶoŵiĐ poliĐǇ staŶĐe ǁith that 
of the preceding right government. The choice was thus made to adopt an economic policy radically 
at odds with the expectations of the bulk of the social base of the government parties. Attributing 
the failure of the Keynesian policy followed in 1981 to the lack of external competitiveness of the 
French productive system, the left governments chose to focus on the supply side in order to 
͞ŵodeƌŶise͟ the eĐoŶoŵǇ. Growth and employment would come from a restored competitiveness 
obtained through private investment. This called for a compromise with the business sector through 
a ƌehaďilitatioŶ of the soĐial ƌole of the ͞eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌ͟. The désinflation competitive (competitive 
disinflation) policy implied that the real wage increase expected by a large fraction of the wage-
earners had to be postponed until the return of foreign competitiveness. The latter was to be the 
outcome of a massive investment effort made by firms, both private and public, which implied 
significant wage moderation in order to increase profit margins. The change was sudden and the real 
wage of the working classes, after having strongly increased in 1981, slowed down in 1982 and 
dropped in 1983 (Beaud 1985). The same applied to the retired and the unemployed. The decrease in 
inflation and the improved economic situation enabled more substantial real wage increases after 
the mid-1980s (Figure 7), but the broad supply-side policy orientation was confirmed when the left 
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came back to power in 1988 and, to a lesser extent thanks to a more favourable world growth 
context, in 1997. Considering the expectations of a sizeable part of the left social base, staying in 
power while keeping such an economic policy in the long term would imply for the PS and the 
mainstream left in general to search for an alternative social support. 
 
Figure 7. Median individual annual standard of living in 2010 Euros. Data source: INSEE 
Furthermore, the U-turn of 1983 did not simply mean that the objective of a gradual break-
up with capitalism was discarded; it represented a choice of certain structural reforms which defined 
a particular type of capitalism. The right͛s pƌojeĐt foƌ the FƌeŶĐh eĐoŶoŵǇ ĐaŶ ďe ďƌoadlǇ defiŶed as 
neoliberal since the late 1970s.30 But the model of capitalism of France, at least until the 2000s, was a 
continental European model (Amable 2003), whose main characteristics in terms of social protection, 
regulation of the labour market and involvement of the state in the economy, had been 
strengthened by the first measures taken by left government of 1981. This corresponded to the 
expectations of the social base of the left. But the following left governments implemented structural 
reforms, particularly in the financial system and product market regulation, which weakened some of 
the main characteristics of the model and the associated institutional complementarities (Amable 
2003, 2009, Tiberghien 2007, Amable et al. 2012a). In particular, they never questioned the 
privatisations launched by the right government of 1986-1988; the Jospin government (1997-2002) 
even privatised more companies than any previous right government. This was bound to antagonise 
again the social groups supporting the left, but the PS-led governments preserved, at least until 2012, 
the institutions that were central to the post-war social compromise and crucial for the stabilisation 
of their social base: social protection and the employment relationship (Amable et al. 2012b). 
The right governments (1986-1988, 1993-1997, 2002-2012) were no more successful than 
the left in finding a stable social support. The failure of the radical neoliberal policy implemented in 
1986 could be explained by the narrowness of the social base for such a project. If the issue of 
nationalisations roughly split the electorate in two halves in 1978,31 other issues, such labour market 
flexibility, indicated that there did not exist a political majority for a radical neoliberal turn. In 1978, 
only 20% of the respondents were opposed to prohibiting layoffs unless alternative jobs were found. 
This explains why the privatisation programs launched by the right in 1986 and pursued by all 
following governments never met the type of social protest that structural reforms, particularly 
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 Neoliberalism should not be mistaken for laisser faire and involves a significant involvement of the state, 
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regarding labour market deregulation or social protection, met under the Chirac (students, rail 
workers), Balladur (CIP), Juppé (social protection reform) and Villepin (CNE, CPE) governments. 
Reforming these areas corresponded to the expectations of a fraction of the traditional social base of 
the right (managers, shopkeepers, high-skill private sector employees), but was considered with 
some apprehension by the more moderate fraction of this base (medium-skill employees and clerks 
of the private sector) and led to a strong opposition from the categories affected by the various 
reforms (most notably the young).  
The right tried to reconcile two contradictory objectives with limited success: (i) implement 
radical structural reforms to satisfy the neoliberal core of its social base, and (ii) preserve the bulk of 
the French social model to appease the fears of the more moderate fraction of that base (Amable et 
al. 2012b). Also, the emergence of the FN during the 1980s and 1990s signalled the rise of the 
immigration issue in the political debate, which represented a new divide for the social base of the 
right: the more educated fraction did not express so strongly the anti-immigration feelings that the 
less affluent part of that base entertained. After the alleged immobility of the second Chirac 
presidency (2002-2007), the 2007-2012 Sarkozy presidency represented an attempt to find a 
compromise between the diverging expectations of the right social base: (i) a neoliberal breakup 
implying an increase in labour market flexibility while (ii) maintaining part of the social system, (iii) 
some elements of anti-immigration policy, and (iv) an attempt to improve the standard of living of 
the working classes, neglected by the mainstream left, through a tax cut on extra-hours. In fact, the 
attempt to soothe the contradictions within the right social base was acknowledged in the slogan of 
“aƌkozǇ͛s ϮϬϭϮ pƌesideŶtial ĐaŵpaigŶ: la rupture tranquille (the easy-going break-up). 
6. The perpetual return of the ͞ŵoderŶist͟ project 
Tensions inhabiting the social bloc of the right stem from the contradictions between 
economic structural change and its social consequences. Before 1981, the most conservative part of 
the ƌight͛s soĐial ďase ƌesisted the soĐial iŵpliĐatioŶs of the ŵodeƌŶisatioŶ of the FƌeŶĐh ŵodel of 
capitalism. Right governments managed until that date to find a meditation between the desire for 
stability of social relationships expressed by the most traditional part of its social base with the 
expectation of economic modernisation coming from the most successful social groups. The solution 
of the problem was expressed iŶ GisĐaƌd d͛EstaiŶg͛s slogaŶ foƌ the ϭϵϳϰ PƌesideŶtial ĐaŵpaigŶ: le 
changement sans le risque (change without risk). That solution prevailed politically for 23 years 
(1958-1981), in spite of sometimes intense social contestation. 
A similar problem, leading to different tensions, was present after 1986. Structural change 
was still implying risks, but of a different kind. Economic modernisation took the form of neoliberal 
reforms, and the new implied risks were borne by the bulk of the wage-earners. A new type of 
mediation, associating structural reforms with the preservation of the most significant aspects of the 
French social model, had to be found, as eǆeŵplified ďǇ “aƌkozǇ͛s atteŵpts to fiŶd a FƌeŶĐh-style 
flexicurity (Amable et al. 2012b) instead of the simple labour market flexibility promoted by the 
Chirac government in 1986. However, partly because the Great Recession severely reduced the 
possibilities for implementing that type of solutions, the search for such mediation was not 
successful. 
The strategy of the left was different and is reŵiŶisĐeŶt of the ͞ŵodeƌŶist͟ pƌojeĐt of the 
͞ŶoŶ ĐoŵŵuŶist͟ left duƌiŶg the ϰth Republic. The strong contradiction between the expectations of 
the left bloc and the economic policy followed by left governments had led the PS to envisage very 
early on a change in the social coalitions and political alliances that could support the type of 
government policy that they considered feasible. The figurehead of this option in the 1980s was 
Jacques Delors, who can without any doubts be considered as a modernist, who had been social 
affairs advisor to Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas under the de Gaulle presidency in the 
1960s, Minister of finance between 1981 and 1984 under the Mitterrand presidency and would 
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become President of the European Commission between 1985 and 1995, at the time of the 
completion of the single market and monetary unification. His views on the economic policy of the 
left were exposed in a book (Alexandre and Delors 1985) published shortly after he left the 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt aŶd ďefoƌe he joiŶed the EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ, at a tiŵe ǁheŶ he Đould ͚speak his 
mind͛ ǁithout takiŶg Đaƌe of ͚tactics, precautions or imperatives of opportunity͛ (p.221). The book is a 
violent charge against the economic policy options favoured by programme commun, 
nationalisations in particular,32 but also the macroeconomic policy or more generally state 
intervention in the economy. It even takes on board part of the neo-conservative rhetoric against the 
welfare state, stating that the first effect of the protection granted by modern societies to their 
citizens is to ǁeakeŶ theŵ. The ͚ďuƌdeŶ͛ of soĐial pƌoteĐtioŶ is presented as inhibiting risk taking and 
iŶŶoǀatioŶ, aŶd uŶeŵploǇŵeŶt ďeŶefits ǁould ďe ͚nothing less than a powerful disincentive to work͛ 
(p.56). The book bemoans the ͚civil wars͛ aŶd the ͚centrist void͛ that ŵake FƌaŶĐe the ǀiĐtiŵ of 
extremism: communism on the left and populism on the right. It advocates a management of the 
economy away from wildcat liberalism and socialism, a ͚historical compromise͛ that ǁould guaƌaŶtee 
soft tƌaŶsitioŶs ďetǁeeŶ ͚the wise of each side͛ (p.28).  
However, the book also stated that such an economic compromise had not found its social 
and political expression. The same diagnostic would be made in 1995, when Delors renounced to 
take part in the presidential campaign because he had no hope of finding the political majority 
necessary to support the economic policy he wanted to implement. The centre parties were allied to 
the right since the beginning of the 5th Republic, and the PS was not ready to relinquish its electoral 
alliance with the PCF. A previous attempt to reshuffle the party alliances had taken place after the 
debacles at the 1993 (legislative) and 1994 (European) elections, when ex-Prime Minister Michel 
Rocard33 called for a ͞big bang͟ that would break up the divide between the left and the right, 
without any effect. All subsequent attempts to question the left-right divide have been limited to a 
handful of left (right) individuals participating in a right (left) government. 
However, lack of success of the break-up of the left-right divide did not mean that the option 
was dropped from the agenda of the mainstream left or that the problem of finding a stable social 
base was ignored. In 1999, Lionel Jospin had mentioned the possibility of finding a rather fuzzy ͞new 
alliance͟ ďetǁeeŶ the ǁoƌkiŶg aŶd ŵiddle Đlasses aŶd the ͞outsideƌs͟ ;‘eǇ ϮϬϬϰͿ. More realistically, 
the middle classes have become the core support of the PS, and a new definition of the social base 
would imply to rely on the fraction of the left base less concerned with structural reforms or supply 
side-oriented macroeconomic policy and aggregate the elements of the social base of the right that 
would be likely to support such policies. In the political context of the early 2010s, such an option 
would require a political alliance between the PS and at least parts of EELV, MoDem and possibly the 
moderate fraction of UMP. More importantly, a viable strategy would demand a social base united 
by common expectations. Such expectations should not be characteristic of the left-right divide. 
The consideration of the results of Tables 4 to 6 give some indications on the type of political 
demands that the new political alliance could address. A certain number of issues favour the 
emergence of a bloc bourgeois (Amable et al. 2012b, Amable & Palombarini 2014), i.e. a social 
coalition of the educated upper and middle classes. The first of these issues is that of European 
integration. It is a significant determinant of the sympathy for EELV, the PS and MoDem. Further 
European integration is supported by educated and affluent groups, which do not support a radical 
left economic policy, which is also the case of the bulk of the supporters of EELV and even more so 
for the MoDem. The European integration issue is a powerful factor of division for the left, as has 
been shown at the time of the 2005 referendum on the European constitutional treaty, but also for 
the right. European integration promotes an economic model which is compatible with the pro-
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 Delors, like Michel Rocard, were opposed to a 100% participation of the state in nationalized firms. They 
preferred a 51% participation. 
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 Figuƌehead of the ͞seĐoŶd left͟, hostile to the ĐoŵŵuŶist paƌtǇ, MiĐhel ‘oĐaƌd alǁaǇs ĐoŶsideƌed hiŵself as 
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market and pro-globalisation options chosen by the mainstream left  ─ fƌee tƌade, fƌee ŵoďilitǇ of 
Đapital, ǁage ŵodeƌatioŶ, oƌthodoǆ ŵoŶetaƌǇ poliĐǇ, ͞souŶd͟ puďliĐ fiŶaŶĐe, laďouƌ ŵaƌket 
fleǆiďilitǇ ─ ǁhile at the saŵe tiŵe pƌeseƌǀiŶg a ĐeƌtaiŶ degƌee of soĐial pƌoteĐtioŶ ;the Euƌopean 
social model, an ͞active͟ welfare state, etc.), at least in theory.  
When one looks at the expectations regarding economic policy, the sympathy towards EELV 
comes from individuals favourable to public spending, but less favourable to redistribution and not 
so hostile to the pension reform. In this respect, the potential social base of the ecologists is closer to 
that of the Centre (MoDem) than that of the radical left or even the PS. The eĐologists͛ suppoƌt is 
found among citizens culturally progressive but only partly supporting left economic policies. 
Sympathisers of the MoDem are close to those of the PS regarding cultural values and hold centrist 
or conservative positions on economic policy expectations. The increase in the power of the EU is 
relatively supported by individuals with high wealth levels, managers and high-skill employees of the 
private and public sectors as well as students, medium-skill public servants and the retired. A very 
similar support can be found for the proposition to increase the VAT. The opposition to such 
measures gathers the broad low income groups. There may therefore exist a skill- or income-based 
social alliance that would support only part of the right͛s economic policy propositions (pension 
reform, VAT...) or share some of the left societal values (homosexuals͛ ƌights, attitude toǁaƌds 
immigrants...) and be united on issues such as European integration against other social groups more 
inclined to support the radical left or right. One finds thus a possible policy line for the bloc bourgeois 
with European integration as its main element, involving possible structural reforms (cf. the 
appreciation of the pension reform) or labour market flexibilisation, while keeping a moderate 
degree of income redistribution or social protection. 
The necessity to find such a social coalition was ͞theoƌised͟ ďǇ an influential think tank close 
to the PS during the 2012 Presidential campaign (Terra Nova 2011). They identified sociological 
reasons for the decline of social democracy, the main one being the decline of the working class.34 
The latter is described as culturally conservative, when not outright xenophobic, and clinging to 
allegedly outdated economic beliefs in a left economic policy based on income equality and social 
pƌoteĐtioŶ: ͚the ŵodel of soĐietǇ suppoƌted ďǇ soĐial deŵoĐƌaĐǇ ─ the soĐial market economy, around 
the ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of the ǁelfaƌe state ─ is as such no longer compatible ǁith the Ŷeǁ gloďalised ǁoƌld’ 
(p.6). Therefore, the mainstream left should giǀe up ͚the historical coalition of the left...uniting the 
popular classes (workers, Đleƌks) aŶd the loǁeƌ ŵiddle Đlasses’ (p.52) and look for a new social base, 
͚FƌaŶĐe of toŵoƌƌoǁ͛, ǁith ͚pƌogƌessiǀe͛ Đultuƌal ǀalues aŶd aŶ ͚outsideƌ͛ socio-economic status 
(young graduates, women, minorities). The extension of this somewhat narrow ͞outsider͟ base, 
taken to welcome labour market flexibility, which is questionable in the light of the results of Table 
5,35 should be made in the direction of the educated middle classes, which would share cultural 
values with the left. This would imply to drop social and economic propositions too characteristic of 
the left ;͚a strong and protective state, public services, social protection͛ p.ϭϮͿ aŶd foĐus oŶ a 
narrative based on cultural values. 
The policy implemented by the Ayrault government in the first two years after the election of 
François Hollande in 2012 confirms this broad orientation (Amable and Palombarini 2014). The 
economic policy took an employer-friendly direction; the main objective being to encourage private 
investment in order to build new productive capacities and restore competitiveness, elements taken 
to be necessary conditions for employment growth. The parallel with the economic policy stance of 
the PS-led governments in the 1980s, after the U-turn, is striking. The supply-side orientation of the 
economic policy was confirmed by François Hollande himself, who endorsed “aǇ͛s laǁ ─ supplǇ 
creates its own deŵaŶd ─ iŶ a pƌess ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe iŶ February 2014, thereby putting to rest any hopes 
for a Keynesian policy during his mandate. At the same time, the most significantly left-oriented 
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 This decline seems to be grossly exaggerated however. Workers still represented 22% of the employed 
workforce in 2009 (29% in 1982). (Data from Enquêtes emploi, INSEE)  
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 See also Amable (2013). 
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policy measure taken was to grant homosexual couples the possibility to be married. The policy 
options of the Hollande presidency are therefore culturally progressive and economically orthodox. 
Teƌƌa Noǀa ;ϮϬϭϭͿ͛s pƌesĐƌiptioŶs about the neglect of the working classes were followed by 
François Hollande. One of the first industrial problem he had to solve with was the future of the 
Mittal Steel plant in Florange. During the campaign, Hollande had vowed not to follow the footsteps 
of Nicolas Sarkozy, who had reneged on his 2007 campaign promise to have Mittal Steel keep the 
Gandrange plant operating.36 Faced with the prospect of a closure of the Florange site, an alternative 
solution, favoured by the left of the PS, was to nationalise the plant. Hollande never believed in this 
solution, nor did he in the future of the Florange site. He rejected the alternative solution, promoted 
by his Minister for industrial recovery, and let Mittal Steel mothball the blast furnaces.  When a 
journalist pointed out to him that such a decision could entail significant electoral costs, Hollande͛s 
answer was simply: ͚among blue-collar workers, yes, but it does not matter’. (Amar 1994 p.65). 
The possible constitution of a bloc bourgeois as a dominant social coalition raises the 
question of the potential opposition to such a bloc. On the political side, both the radical left and the 
radical right would be kept out of government coalitions. One can hardly find common elements 
among their respective social bases in Tables 4 to 6. Lack of support to radical opposition to 
European integration is the only possible common element among supporters of the radical left and 
right. But no cultural and economic policy preferences are common to supporters of the radical left 
and the radical right. The former are characterised by expectations of a left-oriented economic policy 
and culturally progressive values.37 The latter express opposite preferences. Therefore, these results 
ĐoŶfiƌŵ MaǇeƌ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ͛s fiŶdiŶg that theƌe is Ŷo ͞hoƌseshoe͟ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of the politiĐal spaĐe 
ǁheƌeďǇ ͞eǆtƌeŵes͟ ǁould soŵehoǁ ŵeet. If the FN can indeed draw the support of some fractions 
of the popular classes, the social orientation of the economic program of the FN seems to matter 
little in this phenomenon. The appeal to economically conservative positions on the tax system or 
the size of public intervention has a more significant influence. The fraction of the popular electorate 
having some sympathy for the FN is therefore characterised by conservative inclinations both in the 
societal and economic dimensions. 
Nevertheless, the U-turn in the economic policy stance of the FN, from ultra liberalism to a 
defence of social protection, could be interpreted as a long-term search for mediation in order to 
unite a social groups kept outside of the bloc bourgeois, toning down the culturally conservative 
elements of the manifesto, which are taken for granted by the core social base of the FN anyway, 
and emphasising elements likely to win over social groups for which the economic dimension matters 
significantly. A successful mediation, if it can be found, would not imply a blatantly infeasible political 
alliance between the radical right and the radical left, but would more probably involve the FN 
attempting to become the dominant political party representing the social groups excluded from the 
bloc bourgeois.  
7. Conclusion 
The enduring French political crisis has been interpreted as the expression of contradictions 
between the economic policies implemented by the successive governments and the existence of a 
dominant social bloc, i.e. a coalition of social groups that would politically support the dominant 
political strategy. Since 1978, both the right and the left have failed to find a solution to the 
contradictions between the policies they implemented and the expectations of their social bases, 
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  The plaŶt ǁas Đlosed shoƌtlǇ afteƌ “aƌkozǇ͛s eleĐtioŶ. 
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 One may draw a parallel with Germany. Bowyer and Vail (2011) show that supporters of the radical left party 
die Linke aƌe Ŷot siŵplǇ ͚the loseƌs͛ fƌoŵ eĐoŶoŵiĐ ŵodeƌŶisatioŶ ďut ĐitizeŶs shaƌiŶg siŵilaƌ ďeliefs ƌegaƌdiŶg 
economic policy. 
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which are themselves inhabited by tensions and contradictions that evolve with the structure of 
French capitalism.  
Under the Hollande presidency, the mainstream left seems to have chosen a possibility that 
has been considered for at least three decades: a renewal of their social base, implying in due course 
a change in political alliances. The corresponding dominant social bloc, the bloc bourgeois, would be 
based on skilled middle and higher classes, and would express culturally progressive values and 
expect social-liberal economic policies. The mainstream left would not aim to represent the interests 
of the working classes, taken to be culturally regressive and expressing economic policy demands 
that would be outdated or impossible to satisfy in the context of a globalised economy. 
This option is not radically new. It corresponds to a strategy followed ďǇ the ͞ŵodeƌŶists͟ in 
the post-Waƌ peƌiod, desĐƌiďed iŶ the folloǁiŶg ǁaǇ iŶ GauƌoŶ ;ϭϵϴϴͿ: ͚the modernists have 
ƌeŵaiŶed ͞ŵeŶdesist͟ iŶ theiƌ ƌefusal to take iŶto ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ the ĐoŵŵuŶist ǀotes, that is in the 
eŶd to take iŶto aĐĐouŶt the eǆpeĐtatioŶs of the ǁoƌkiŶg Đlass. TheǇ iŵagiŶed theiƌ oǁŶ ͞ŵodeƌŶ͟ 
wage-earning class, made of technicians, high-skilled, service sector employees, white collars; they 
gave themselves new social, feminist, autonomist, ecologist movements... that mobilise this 
͟ŵodeƌŶ͟ ǁage-eaƌŶiŶg Đlass. The ǁoƌkiŶg Đlass aŶd its ǁoƌld ƌeŵaiŶ alieŶ to theŵ’ (p.288, our 
translation).  
Gauron (1988) considered that the success of the left governments would be conditioned on 
the removal of two obstacles: (i) a strong communist party, which scared the more moderate part of 
the possible extended social base of the left, aŶd ;iiͿ the ŵodeƌŶists͛ eǆĐlusioŶ of a fraction of the 
wage-earners (the working classes) from the benefits of the reforms. Removing both obstacles 
implied a PS strongly anchored to the left. However, the removal of the first obstacle seems to have 
consolidated the second one, and left the ͞ŵodeƌŶist͟ stƌategǇ as the easiest optioŶ to folloǁ foƌ the 
PS, in a context where policies that would correspond to the expectations of the traditional left bloc 
have been made increasingly difficult to implement within the constraints defined by European 
integration and several decades of liberalisation, two structural constraints that the action of PS-led 
governments has either favoured or not hindered very much. However, the political solution of the 
bloc bourgeois is no guarantee that the contradictions between the social consequences of 
͞modernisation͟ and the chosen political strategy are solved. This problem doomed the first 
attempts of the modernists. 
The right seems to have a problem resembling that of the left during the 4th Republic and 
face itself the same two obstacles mentioned by Gauron (1988), with the FN replacing the PCF. The 
findings of the empirical analysis performed in this paper would tend to indicate that a strategy 
analogous to that of François Mitterrand for the left, a union of the rights, would meet its social base 
provided an adequate mediation could be found. This would, on the basis of the results exposed 
above, be possible considering the relative proximity in the cultural values and economic policy 
expectations of the respective supporters of the FN and the mainstream right. However, as shown by 
the failure of Sarkozy, the Great Recession and its aftermath as well as the evolution of French 
capitalism, in a slow transition from a continental European to a neoliberal model, make such a 
mediation increasingly difficult to find. On the other hand, the same evolutions, by intensifying the 
difficulties of the popular classes, could facilitate the emergence of a bloc of outsiders to the bloc 
bourgeois.  
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